PROJET AUTOBLOG


Krebs on Security

Site original : Krebs on Security

⇐ retour index

Mise à jour

Mise à jour de la base de données, veuillez patienter...

SendGrid: Employee Account Hacked, Used to Steal Customer Credentials

lundi 27 avril 2015 à 22:51

Sendgrid, an email service used by tens of thousands of companies — including Silicon Valley giants as well as Bitcoin exchange Coinbase — said attackers compromised a Sendgrid employee’s account, which was then used to steal the usernames, email addresses and (hashed) passwords of customer and employee accounts. The announcement comes several weeks after Sendgrid sought to assure customers that the breach was limited to a single customer account.

sg1On April 9, The New York Times reported that Coinbase had its Sendgrid credentials compromised, and that thieves were apparently using the access to launch phishing attacks against Bitcoin-related businesses. Sendgrid took issue with the Times piece for implying that SendGrid had incurred a platform-wide breach. “The story has now been updated to reflect that only a single SendGrid customer account was compromised,” Sendgrid wrote in a blog post published that same day.

Today, Sendgrid published another post walking that statement back a bit, saying it now had more information about the extent of the intrusion thanks to assistance from data breach investigators:

“After further investigation in collaboration with law enforcement and FireEye’s (Mandiant) Incident Response Team, we became aware that a SendGrid employee’s account had been compromised by a cyber criminal and used to access several of our internal systems on three separate dates in February and March 2015,” wrote David Campbell, Sendgrid’s chief security officer.  Campbell continues:

“These systems contained usernames, email addresses, and (salted and iteratively hashed) passwords for SendGrid customer and employee accounts. In addition, evidence suggests that the cyber criminal accessed servers that contained some of our customers’ recipient email lists/addresses and customer contact information. We have not found any forensic evidence that customer lists or customer contact information was stolen. However, as a precautionary measure, we are implementing a system-wide password reset. Because SendGrid does not store customer payment cards we do know that payment card information was not involved.”

Sendgrid is urging customers to change their passwords, and to take advantage of the company’s multi-factor authentication offering. Sendgrid also said it is working to add more authentication methods for its two-factor security, and to expedite the release of special “API keys” that will allow customers to use keys instead of passwords for sending email through its systems.

Sendgrid manages billions of emails for some big brand names, including Pinterest, Spotify and Uber. This reach makes them a major target of fraudsters and spammers, who would like nothing more than to control whitelisted accounts capable of blasting out so much email each day.

In March 2015, U.S. prosecutors indicted three men in connection with the April 2011 compromise of commercial email giant Epsilon. Days after that break-in, customers at dozens of Fortune 500 companies began complaining of receiving spam to email addresses they’d created specifically for use with the companies directly served by Epsilon and its network of email providers.

What’s Your Security Maturity Level?

lundi 27 avril 2015 à 06:06

Not long ago, I was working on a speech and found myself trying to come up with a phrase that encapsulates the difference between organizations that really make cybersecurity a part of their culture and those that merely pay it lip service and do the bare minimum (think ‘15 pieces of flair‘). When the phrase “security maturity” came to mind, I thought for sure I’d conceived of an original idea and catchy phrase.

It turns out this is already a thing. And a really notable thing at that. The graphic below, produced last year by the Enterprise Strategy Group, does a nice job of explaining why some companies just don’t get it when it comes to taking effective measures to manage cyber risks and threats.

SecurityMaturity

Very often, experience is the best teacher here: Data breaches have a funny way of forcing organizations — kicking and screaming — from one vertical column to another in the Security Maturity matrix. Much depends on whether the security professionals in the breached organization have a plan (ideally, in advance of the breach) and the clout for capitalizing on the brief post-breach executive attention on security to ask for changes and resources that can assist the organization in learning from its mistakes and growing.

But the Security Maturity matrix doesn’t just show how things are broken: It also provides a basic roadmap for organizations that wish to change that culture. Perhaps unsurprisingly, entities that are able to manage that transition typically have a leadership that is invested in and interested in making security a core priority. The real trick is engineering ways to influence the leadership, with or without the fleeting momentum offered by a breach.

At last week’s RSA Security Conference in San Francisco, I had a chance to meet up with Demetrios “Laz” Lazarikos, the former chief information security officer at Sears. Now founder of the security consultancy blue-lava.net, Laz spends a great deal of time trying to impress upon his clients the need to take the security maturity model seriously. Here’s his sliding scale, which measures maturity in terms of preparedness and expectations.

Source: Blue Lava

Source: Blue Lava

I like Laz’s models because they’re customized to every organization, breaking down each business unit into its own security maturity score. The abbreviations in the graphic below — SDLC and PMO — stand for “security development life cycle” and “project management office,” respectively. Dark red boxes (marked with a “1”) indicate areas where the organization’s business unit needs the most work.

Source: Blue Lava Consulting

Source: Blue Lava Consulting

Laz’s security maturity hierarchy includes five levels:

Where does your organization fit in these models? Are they a useful way for getting a handle on security and increasing maturity within your organization? Has your employer recently moved from one security maturity level to another? If so, tell us what you think prompted that shift? Sound off on these or any other thoughts on this subject in the comments below, please.

Taking Down Fraud Sites is Whac-a-Mole

lundi 20 avril 2015 à 08:57

I’ve been doing quite a bit of public speaking lately — usually about cybercrime and underground activity — and there’s one question that nearly always comes from the audience: “Why are these fraud Web sites allowed to operate, and not simply taken down?” This post is intended to serve as the go-to spot for answering that question.

Q: Why not take down the hundreds of sites now selling stolen credit cards and identity data?

Screen Shot 2015-04-19 at 11.53.35 PMA: For starters, it’s not always so easy to take these sites offline. Many of them rely on domain name registrars that routinely ignore abuse requests. The same goes for the organizations hosting a number of these unsavory markets. What’s more, most crime shops have a slew of new domain variations at a variety of hosting providers and registrars that they can turn to if they do get shut down.

More importantly, fraud shops don’t often get shut down because they are quite useful to law enforcement, banks and researchers alike. Stolen data that has value among computer crooks will always find a way onto illicit markets; it benefits the aforementioned parties if those markets aren’t so exclusive that the crooks can no longer easily view or buy the data for sale.

As I’ve discussed in several articles, banks and law enforcement often use these services to figure out which merchant has been hacked; to help stanch the flow of new stolen data; and, effectively, stop the breach.

Q: Why are there so many of these card shops hosted in the clear Web, instead of via Tor, I2P or some other anonymization technology that allows the shop to hide its true Internet address? 

A: Most card shops sell only a tiny fraction (think single-digit percentages) of the cards they have for sale at any one time. As I noted in the second half of this piece, the thieves in charge of the shop primarily responsible for selling cards stolen from Target and Home Depot only sold a very small percentage of the more than 100 million credit and debit cards they stole from those two companies. Russian computer forensics firm Group-IB found similar single-digit sales figures at swipe[dot]su, a long running card shop that they hacked last year.

In short, stolen cards are not like fine wines: They don’t age well. The minute they are put up for sale, their value starts to decline. And there are many times more stolen cards available than there are crooks to absorb anywhere near double-digit percentages of cards stolen from a given merchant. Hence, it behooves the card vendors to make their shops as accessible and easy-to-use as possible.

Q: How come law enforcement officials can’t just put these guys and others out of business or behind bars for this activity?

A: Occasionally, the proprietors of these card shops do get arrested and jailed. But a great many of the sites are run by individuals living in Russia and Ukraine. Neither nation has shown itself particularly anxious to arrest cyber crooks within its borders, so long as those crooks are mainly picking on targets outside of their home country. Also, cybercrooks based in Russia and Ukraine who don’t steal from their own generally have little to fear from foreign law enforcement and governments provided they don’t travel to Western-friendly nations.

Q: Okay, but can’t we all achieve a certain catharsis from taking these sites offline?

A: Sure, but those fraud sites will be back online before you can say “where’s my debit card.” Most experienced card shops list on their home pages several — if not dozens — of alternate domains that customers can use in the event that the current one gets shut down. While this certainly presents a ripe target list for anyone wishing to take these sites offline, see the answer to the first question above for why this generally gets harder with every successive takedown.

Q: So is there nothing we can do to disrupt these crime shops that isn’t also disruptive to security folk looking to gain intelligence about who’s hacked?

A: Most of the top card fraud shops have redesigned their business models around creating a smoother customer experience. Gone are the days when a serious card shop could ignore customer complaints and still do a brisk and loyal business. It’s all about reputation. Creating a positive customer experience is the key to the way these guys establish legitimacy and loyalty among customers. But interfere with that customer experience — and seller reputation — enough, and that business may very well die on the vine.

POS Providers Feel Brunt of PoSeidon Malware

mercredi 15 avril 2015 à 16:35

“PoSeidon,” a new strain of malicious software designed to steal credit and debit card data from hacked point-of-sale (POS) devices, has been implicated in a number of recent breaches involving companies that provide POS services primarily to restaurants, bars and hotels. The shift by the card thieves away from targeting major retailers like Target and Home Depot to attacking countless, smaller users of POS systems is giving financial institutions a run for their money as they struggle to figure out which merchants are responsible for card fraud.

Image: Cisco.

Image: Cisco.

One basic tool that banks use to learn the source of card data theft involves determining a “common point-of-purchase” (CPP) among a given set of customer cards that experience fraud. When a new batch of cards goes on sale at an online crime shop, banks will often purchase a very small number of their stolen cards to determine if the victim customers all shopped at the same merchant across a specific time period.

This same CPP analysis was critical to banks helping this reporter identify some of the biggest retail breaches on record in recent years, and it is a method heavily relied upon by law enforcement agencies to identify breach victims.

But the CPP approach usually falls flat if all of the cards purchased from the fraud shop fail to reveal a common merchant. More seasoned fraud shops have sought to achieve this confusion and confound investigators by “making sausage” — i.e., methodically mixing cards stolen from multiple victims into any single new batch of stolen cards that they offer for sale.

Increasingly, however, fraudsters selling stolen cards don’t need to make sausage: The victims that are leaking card data are already subsets of restaurant franchises or retail establishments whose only commonality is the branded point-of-sale device which they rely upon to process customer card transactions.

NEXTEP

Card breaches involving POS devices sold by the same vendor are notoriously hard for financial institutions to diagnose because the banks very often have a direct relationship with neither the POS vendor nor the breached restaurant or bar whose customers’ cards were stolen.

nextepWhat’s more, POS-specific breaches frequently tie back to a subset of customers of a POS vendor who in turn rely on local IT company to install and support the POS systems. The commonality among breached restaurants and bars tends to be those who have relied on a support firm that invariably enables remote access to the POS systems via tools like pcAnywhere or LogMeIn using the same or easily-guessed username and password across many customer systems. Once remotely authenticated to the targeted systems, thieves can upload malware like POSeidon, which is capable of capturing all card data processed by the victim POS.

A few weeks ago, this reporter broke the news that multiple systems run by POS vendor NEXTEP had experienced a breach. The banks were only able to pinpoint NEXTEP systems as the source because the overwhelming number of merchants impacted in that breached happened to be NEXTEP customers who also were part of the Zoup chain of soup restaurants.

“You may have seen the discussions of the ‘PoSeidon’ malware that specifically targeted point of sale systems,” NEXTEP CEO Tommy Woycik said in a follow-up email. “Within thirty-six hours of the point that we learned of the problem we were able to internally use our resources to block further data compromise with most of our customers.  We retained and worked with two different sets of consultants to fix all remaining problems and to evaluate, on an ongoing basis, the effectiveness of the fixes.”

Woycik said the company also is investigating why the vast majority of its customers had no compromise of information, but that the hack was limited to a few identified locations. Part of the problem was that some of the breached locations relied on point-of-sale management firms that refused to cooperate in the investigation.

“We have been somewhat hampered in our investigation because some parties involved in the locations that we believe may have been affected have been unwilling to provide us with critical data,” he said.

Bevo POS

More recently, KrebsOnSecurity has heard from multiple banks about suspicions that systems sold and maintained by another POS vendor – Naples, Fla.- based Bevo POS — was likely the source of fraud for more than a dozen restaurants and bars in and around Florida.

bevoReached for comment about these allegations, Bevo POS CEO Onur Haytac responded by acknowledging that a very small subset of its customers were indeed the victim of PoSeidon.

“Was Bevo POS ever breached?  No, however, Windows was. Bevo POS is Point of Sale application (not cloud based) that is both PCI compliant and encrypts all credit card data,” he explained. “The malware identified, PoSeidon, which pushes itself with DLL injection and backdoor Trojans, is a keylogger with memory scraping that breached Windows, and as I’m sure you are aware, Microsoft’s security essentials anti-virus and windows updates do not recognize or stop many of the newer more unique threats. The same day we were alerted to a possible compromise, our engineers found an executable that had been recently installed in Windows at that location, called ‘Winhost.exe.’”

According to Haytac, the company learned of the incidents on March 15. He said the breach occurred with memory scraping as the data passed through while Windows was sending the data to the Bevo application, basically capitalizing on a ‘millisecond gap’ between the systems.   

“A mere 0.26% of customers (13 out of 6,500) were effected and we not only identified the malware within 24 hours (5 days before it was publicly reported by the security experts), we had created a PoSeidon killer tool, and swept every customers machine within a week.  Actual Windows breaches of our customers only occurred over a two day period.”

Haytac said the most frustrating aspect of the ordeal so far is that all of its customers have some form of Windows anti-virus software and that none of these applications were able to recognize the malware. 

“So to prevent future possibilities of this ‘gap’ in the system being tapped again by relentless hackers, we have made an agreement with Comodo to create a new-age containment software that includes anti-virus,” he said. “We are pushing this to all our customers, closing the gap between these breach techniques and Windows OS. We are due to ship this weekend as we are in final stages of testing. Windows is obviously not our product to protect, however our customers are, so we are doing it regardless and without cost to them.”

RESCATOR REVISITED

For several months following revelations that fraudsters had stolen 56 million cards from customers of Home Depot, the card shop principally responsible for selling those cards — Rescator[dot]cm (the same hackers thought to be responsible for the Target intrusion) — inexplicably stopped selling new cards stolen from main-street merchants and retailers.

This hiatus continued for an unprecedented six months until March 10, 2015, when Rescator and his merry band of thieves advertised the “American Dream” batch of credit cards. Days later, the Rescator shop pushed out millions of cards in rapid-fire batches variously named “Breakthrough,” “American Dream,” “Imperium Romanum” and “Spring Awakening.”

One of the many newer "dumps" batches added to the Rescator fraud shop in recent weeks.

One of the many newer “dumps” batches added to the Rescator fraud shop in recent weeks.

Multiple financial institutions contacted by this author purchased handfuls of their cards from these batches, but were unable to find a single common point-of-purchase among any of them. However, each bank said they saw within each batch a strong preponderance of small restaurants and bars that they’d been watching for months as a suspected source of stolen cards. The banks reported to KrebsOnSecurity that the bulk of these establishments are centered around cities in Colorado, Texas, Florida and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area — including Virginia and Maryland.

BRIAN’S DUMP

The above-mentioned trend away from selling cards stolen from major retail chains toward attacking smaller bars and restaurants is hardly unique to the Rescator shop. Earlier this year, several security experts pointed out that a relative newcomer to the fraud scene — a card shop that markets its wares by capitalizing on the name and likeness of this author (briansdump[dot]ru) — also was pushing fairly large batches of stolen cards onto its shelves.

An advertisement for the carding shop "briansdump[dot]ru" promotes "dumps from the  legendary Brian Krebs. Needless to say, this is not an endorsed site.

An advertisement for the carding shop “briansdump[dot]ru” promotes “dumps from the legendary Brian Krebs.” Needless to say, this is not an endorsed site.

KrebsOnSecurity worked with three different banks who each acquired multiple customer cards from all of the batches of cards that showed up for sale on Briansdump. Eerily enough, all of the merchants identified were from small restaurants and bars in and around the Washington, D.C. area, the hometown of Yours Truly.

OTHER SOLUTIONS

Security vendors have long recommended “end-to-end” or “point-to-point” encryption products and services to sidestep threats like PoSeidon. The idea being that if the card data never traverses the local network or point-of-sale device in an unencrypted format, any card-stealing malware that makes its way to the point-of-sale systems will have nothing to steal but worthless gibberish.

The problem is that many merchants — particularly smaller ones — don’t seem particularly interested in or incentivized to invest in these technologies, which tend to require more up-front costs and on-going maintenance fees to security vendors, said Rich Stuppy, chief operating officer at Kount, a payments security firm based in Boise, Idaho.

“It’s a fundamental redrawing of how the bits are transmitted, and that also tends to redraw a lot of power into another end of the network, either to a card brand or to a point of sale company, and it dramatically changes who’s got the power in this situation,” Stuppy said.

As for why more smaller merchants don’t turn to solutions like point-to-point and end-to-end encryption, Stuppy said it’s a numbers game that favors the attackers.

“I think the bigger [merchants] could maybe put up the fence around this such that it gets harder and harder, but the little guys aren’t going to do that. With these widely distributed point-of-sale systems, the bad guys are looking to just plug in the malware once, and it doesn’t matter if you have to get the big guys once to get 50 million cards, or you have to get 1,000 cards from 50,000 compromised merchants.”

For a deep dive into PoSeidon malware, check out this Mar. 25, 2015 blog post from researchers at Cisco.

Critical Updates for Windows, Flash, Java

mardi 14 avril 2015 à 20:34

Get your patch chops on people, because chances are you’re running software from Microsoft, Adobe or Oracle that received critical security updates today. Adobe released a Flash Player update to fix at least 22 flaws, including one flaw that is being actively exploited. Microsoft pushed out 11 update bundles to fix more than two dozen bugs in Windows and associated software, including one that was publicly disclosed this month. And Oracle has an update for its Java software that addresses at least 15 flaws, all of which are exploitable remotely without any authentication.

brokenflash-aAdobe’s patch includes a fix for a zero-day bug (CVE-2015-3043) that the company warns is already being exploited. Users of the Adobe Flash Player for Windows and Macintosh should update to Adobe Flash Player 17.0.0.169 (the current versions other OSes is listed in the chart below).

If you’re unsure whether your browser has Flash installed or what version it may be running, browse to this link. Adobe Flash Player installed with Google Chrome, as well as Internet Explorer on Windows 8.x, should automatically update to version 17.0.0.169.

Google has an update available for Chrome that fixes a slew of flaws, and I assume it includes this Flash update, although the Flash checker pages only report that I now have version 17.0.0 installed after applying the Chrome update and restarting (the Flash update released last month put that version at 17.0.0.134, so this is not particularly helpful). To force the installation of an available update, click the triple bar icon to the right of the address bar, select “About Google” Chrome, click the apply update button and restart the browser.

The most recent versions of Flash should be available from the Flash home page, but beware potentially unwanted add-ons, like McAfee Security Scan. To avoid this, uncheck the pre-checked box before downloading, or grab your OS-specific Flash download from here. Windows users who browse the Web with anything other than Internet Explorer may need to apply this patch twice, once with IE and again using the alternative browser (Firefox, Opera, e.g.).

brokenwindowsMicrosoft has released 11 security bulletins this month, four of which are marked “critical,” meaning attackers or malware can exploit them to break into vulnerable systems with no help from users, save for perhaps visiting a booby-trapped or malicious Web site. The Microsoft patches fix flaws in Windows, Internet Explorer (IE), Office, and .NET

The critical updates apply to two Windows bugs, IE, and Office. .NET updates have a history of taking forever to apply and introducing issues when applied with other patches, so I’d suggest Windows users apply all other updates, restart and then install the .NET update (if available for your system).

Oracle’s quarterly “critical patch update” plugs 15 security holes. If you have Java installed, please update it as soon as possible. Windows users can check for the program in the Add/Remove Programs listing in Windows, or visit Java.com and click the “Do I have Java?” link on the homepage. Updates also should be available via the Java Control Panel or fromJava.com.

If you really need and use Java for specific Web sites or applications, take a few minutes to update this software. In the past, updating via the control panel auto-selected the installation of third-party software, so be sure to look for any pre-checked “add-ons” before proceeding with an update through the Java control panel. Also, Java 7 users should note that Oracle has ended support for Java 7 after this update. The company has been quietly migrating Java 7 users to Java 8, but if this hasn’t happened for you yet and you really need Java installed in the browser, grab a copy of Java 8. The recommended version is Java 8 Update 45.

javamessOtherwise, seriously consider removing Java altogether. I have long urged end users to junk Java unless they have a specific use for it (this advice does not scale for businesses, which often have legacy and custom applications that rely on Java). This widely installed and powerful program is riddled with security holes, and is a top target of malware writers and miscreants.

If you have an affirmative use or need for Java, there is a way to have this program installed while minimizing the chance that crooks will exploit unknown or unpatched flaws in the program: unplug it from the browser unless and until you’re at a site that requires it (or at least take advantage of click-to-play, which can block Web sites from displaying both Java and Flash content by default). The latest versions of Java let users disable Java content in web browsers through the Java Control Panel. Alternatively, consider a dual-browser approach, unplugging Java from the browser you use for everyday surfing, and leaving it plugged in to a second browser that you only use for sites that require Java.

Many people confuse Java with  JavaScript, a powerful scripting language that helps make sites interactive. Unfortunately, a huge percentage of Web-based attacks use JavaScript tricks to foist malicious software and exploits onto site visitors. For more about ways to manage JavaScript in the browser, check out my tutorial Tools for a Safer PC.

Error happened! 0 - SQLite3::exec(): database disk image is malformed In: /home/cochisebee/www/autoblog/autoblogs/autoblog.php:285 http://autoblog.cochi.se/autoblogs/krebsonsecuritycom_4eab703a256df265f3abda6134d777218e00ffe9/?84 #0 [internal function]: exception_error_handler(2, 'SQLite3::exec()...', '/home/cochisebe...', 285, Array) #1 /home/cochisebee/www/autoblog/autoblogs/autoblog.php(285): SQLite3->exec('INSERT INTO art...') #2 /home/cochisebee/www/autoblog/autoblogs/autoblog.php(418): VroumVroum_Blog->insertOrUpdateArticle('https://krebson...', 'Chinese Antivir...', 'https://krebson...', 1600380201, '

The ...') #3 /home/cochisebee/www/autoblog/autoblogs/autoblog.php(932): VroumVroum_Blog->update() #4 /home/cochisebee/www/autoblog/autoblogs/krebsonsecuritycom_4eab703a256df265f3abda6134d777218e00ffe9/index.php(1): require_once('/home/cochisebe...') #5 {main}